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ABSTRACT. The pursuit of truth is woven into the 
fabric of every organism*. Any estimate of how best to 
survive and thrive in the reality in which we are 
immersed requires a sense of self, of the world, and of 
their relationship to each other. I wish to explore the 
idea that this pursuit has at its heart two 
complementary modes of reality testing utilizing 
separate cerebral systems which deal, respectively 
with the correspondence of experience with the world 
and the coherence of the experience with previous 
experiences:  is it real  and  does it fit?  At 
multiple levels of the nervous system, confidence in 
the validity of a belief depends on these two processes 
working independently and in concert. 
I wish to explore the biological significance of 
 belief  and  truth  from the integrative 
      
  
perspective of ethology. That is, the lenses of 
developmental biology, ecology, evolutionary biology, 
and physiology will be focused on the process of 
extracting meaning from experiences. 
Two complementary cerebral processes ordinarily 
work in lockstep to provide us with varying degrees of 
confidence in the strength of ensuing beliefs: These 
processes involve an estimation of the validity of 
correspondence and coherence. Such estimations of 
validity guides the continuing reconciling of 
intentions, expectations, and actions at every level of 
the nervous system, invoking energetically more 
expensive higher levels only when lower levels are 
inadequate. A third cerebral area reveals itself only in 
extraordinary circumstances and appears to evoke 
 hypergnosia,  an overwhelming and sometimes 
ecstatic sense of truth. 
Correspondence  involves  reality-testing  of a 
percept, the cerebral representation of a fragment of 
experience [in the world].  Coherence  involves 
 theorizing,  that is, reality-testing of a percept by 
how well it relates to previous and ongoing parallel 
and collateral experiences. As organisms develop, the 
 reference base  of previous experiences is enlarged 
and refined. A valid correspondence is consonant with 
a theory; a valid theory is corroborated by 
correspondences. In large measure, these mutually 
supportive cerebral processes are lateralized in 
different hemispheres of the brain. Their function is 
more-or-less balanced, but asymmetrical influence on 
confidence can be evoked by developmental 
circumstances that range from the willing suspension 
of disbelief to expectations and other cognitive biases 
that can undermine our effectiveness in the real world. 
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I  
SEEK and SOLVE 
                              
. 
  
            
 ALL men by nature 
desire to know. An 
indication of this is the 
delight we take in our 
senses; for even apart 
from their usefulness they 
are loved for themselves 
...  opening lines of 
Aristotle's Metaphysics  
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. Aristotle's opening comment from the Metaphysics 
gives us a starting point for an exploration of the 
natural history of belief. The "need to know," like 
all motivational systems, varies in perceived 
urgency and is energized accordingly. The vast 
amount of adaptive change, including coping with 
environments that do not meet our expectations, 
occurs at nonconscious levels as a hierarchy of 
progressively more demanding automatized coping 
responses are activated. Dissonance that cannot be 
resolved with these relatively inexpensive 
mechanisms, may evoke an increasing sense of 
urgency until the threshold to consciousness and 
active problem solving is attained.  
The map for this enterprise seems to be a landscape 
of circularity, as the congenital and acquired 
       
  
pathways that are found constantly change and are 
being changed by experience.  
Humans are not alone in their need to know. All 
organisms must develop some sort of sense of their 
competencies, boundaries, and the environment in 
which they must make their way. But as humans 
we seem to be extraordinary in the delight we take. 
Aristotle also identifies a self-reinforcing 
dimension, what Konrad Lorenz calls autotelic 
(1981) when speaking of play.  
Beliefs are learned and like most learning they 
enable organisms to express the behavioral patterns 
they have acquired as a result of experience. Most 
(but certainly not all) experience is of the change is 
the relationship between an organism and its 
environment, sometimes attributable to necessary 
developmental change in the organism, but 
especially the result of changes in the environment 
(and organisms are part of their own 
environments).  
Beliefs are organized relative to the environment in 
which they deploy adaptive actions, but also 
relative to each other. These relationships, 
sometimes ephemeral connections, reflect causation 
as best as possible and constitute a sort of theory. A 
bias that guides future actions and is in return 
reformulated every time an action is less than 
optimal. Much like the theorizing enabled by 
accumulated sensory information, curiosity often 
flourishes best in safe zones, when needs other than 
curiosity are not flooding the system: Klaus Held 
(2002) suggests that such "...curiosity was 
transformed for the first time with the Greeks into 
the striving for a knowledge that no longer had as 
its justification the promise of better orientation 
within individual, particular life-worlds. Aristotle 
introduced the term theôria... for this kind of 
knowing." (Held 2002:89).  
  
The need to know, however, while serving the 
developing human, may be distracting if pursued 
obsessively: the organism need not be perfect, only 
relatively competitive to participate in the 
evolutionary race.* At a certain point, when the 
cost of assimilating and accommodating new 
information exceeds benefit, we may just choose to 
"let the mystery be" (Dement, I. 1992).  
We may take great pleasure from exercising 
curiosity and seeking and solving mysteries, but 
there is also what Rudolph Otto (1923) called the 
Mysterium Tremendum et Fascinans. This is 
something wholly other than a merely fascinating 
mystery: it evokes the awesome, ineffable, sense of 
the numinous, and when apprehended, can sweep 
over one like a tide or burst upon us evoking a 
frenzy or ecstasy. As we become able, there are 
many mysteries of which we can speak. The fixed 
need to know and the flexible sharing of knowledge 
is the gene-culture co-evolutionary spiral. 
(Lumsden).  
Knowing is apparently intrinsically satisfying. 
Abraham Maslow (1966) regarded it as one of "the 
richest sources of esthetic raptures, of semi 
religious ecstasies, of experiences of awe and ... 
among the ultimate joys of living." But ecstasy and 
joy have some corollaries in biology and in the 
instance of  knowing  Maslow might regard it as 
anxiolytic, but more recently we can say that it is at 
least in part because information, as it penetrates 
more deeply into the integrative centers of the 
brain, may stimulate progressively more opioid 
receptors (e.g., Biederman &Vessel. 2008).  
Novelty presents itself relentlessly, and always 
optimizing, that is, assessing cost and benefits: we 
attend to those elements that promise to repay our 
interests the most. All confrontation with novelty 
evokes some measure of activation of the pathways 
that enable the stress response in the autonomic 
  
nervous system and, much like muscle tone, we 
find what for us is at a given time the optimum 
autonomic tone. This tone enables rapid responses 
to coping with novelty, much like our muscles, to 
take advantage of apparent opportunities or avoid 
unnecessary challenges.  
The resolution of a confrontation with novelty or 
unexpected events is the adaptive process described 
by Piaget as,  one of continuous assimilation of 
internally mediated consequences of the 
organism s action on the environment and the 
resulting accommodation of these action schemes 
into the previously formed structure  (Hutcheon 
1996:373, citing Piaget 1980:89).  
If we agree with Einstein that mystery is the key to 
art, science, and religion, then science, by 
increasing the mystery of which we are aware, can 
be viewed as a great  machine of spirituality.  As 
Popper (1968) said, "our knowledge is finite but 
our ignorance is infinite  The more we learn about 
the world, and the deeper our learning, the more 
conscious, specific, and articulate will be our 
knowledge of what we do not know, our 
knowledge of our ignorance." [For this, indeed, is 
the main source of our ignorance--the fact that our 
knowledge can be only finite, while our ignorance 
must necessarily be infinite. ]  
The seek-and-solve strategy of growth and 
development results in progressively effective 
competencies at every level of the organism and 
also an enlarging reservoir of experiences to act as 
reference points to enable more effective coping 
with present and future needs. In their own 
developmental and experiential time, our 
understanding of the realities of the world enlarges. 
Consciously or otherwise, we appreciate their part 
in the causes and consequences of behavioral 
patterns. As patterns become consolidated and 
more reliable in the present, they also become the 
  
filters that evaluate future experiences for their 
utility and the basis on which we make predictions 
about possible future needs. They are our beliefs.  
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II.  
BELIEFS and TRUTHS 
 
                              
. 
  
            
"... knowledge itself is power" 
(Francis Bacon, 1597) . The 
end of our foundation is the 
knowledge of causes, and 
secret motions of things; and 
the enlarging of the bounds 
of human Empire, to the 
effecting of all things 
possible. (1627).  
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Beliefs are states of the organism that enable it to 
cope with change, and they succeed or fail largely 
to the extent that they are valid -- or at least more 
valid than that of their competitors in avoiding 
danger or securing advantage for itself or its kin. 
The vast number of beliefs are changes in the 
organism based on experiences as preliminary as 
sensory-motor reflexes, encounters of which we 
are utterly unaware. There is an extraordinary 
economy in the organism such that only 
ineffective coping at low levels will recruit the 
next most energetically demanding levels. We 
       
  
become aware of dissonances only when they are 
extreme enough to require conscious awareness. 
Thus we make our way through the environment, 
the final arbiter of an organism's ability to 
compete for limited resources or cooperate in 
securing resources for its group.  
The  need to know  Aristotle addressed in the 
opening lines of his Metaphysics is engrained in 
all organisms in a changing environment, but it is 
the mainspring of the human experiment. That is, 
the extracting of patterns from experience that 
enable the development of beliefs that enlarge its 
power over nature at the same time as its capacity 
to respond to the experience of nature evokes 
neuroplastic change. The various mechanisms of 
mind collaborate in this cycle of control and 
coping with the consequences they create. In all 
likelihood these evolved in response to a variety 
of needs and have only recently in our history 
come to have this uneasy alliance of functions 
that enables us to believe and assess relative 
confidence in specific beliefs.  
We hold beliefs and we become progressively 
more-or-less confident in their validity because of 
how they meet biological needs.  
The relative urgency of these needs affects our 
tolerance for ambiguity and the ease with which 
confidence is won. Not every belief is rigorously 
tested, of course, many are scaffolds that enable 
temporary stability while a more elaborate 
cognitive structure is built. Other beliefs are 
recreational or playful, and in support of their 
potential contribution to development, 
understanding, and insight, we even suspend 
disbelief. We hold many beliefs to be relatively 
harmless in the way that many toys and games 
are. Play for example, may contribute 
significantly to the development of useful abilities 
like eye-hand-coordination, social skills, and 
  
perhaps especially, self knowledge. At first we 
acquire knowledge that informs us of personal 
competencies and physical boundaries, but 
eventually cognitive structures, both simple and 
the most elaborate we can devise will develop. 
Pursuing and playing with beliefs as with toys, 
contributes to competence in sensory perception, 
cognitive integration, and selection of appropriate 
actions. But in humans as in other species, as 
maturation continues, play can become very 
serious.  
Biology of Belief. I wish to explore  truth  and 
"belief" from the integrative perspective of 
ethology. I believe(!) that these concepts guide 
the manner in which we control and are 
controlled by our environments and are best 
understood when the lenses of developmental 
biology, ecology, evolutionary biology, and 
physiology are brought to focus on our actions. 
The convergence of these perspectives enables us 
to extract a richer meaning from our experiences 
and thereby invest derived beliefs with more 
confidence. Beliefs are, in this view,  true  in 
proportion to our confidence in their validity, 
however validity can never be complete, although 
its pursuit may be preparation for an 
apprehension of phenomenal truth. Experiences 
we wish to explore are also, admittedly, 
vulnerable to acquired or congenital biases, not 
least of which are limitations on possible 
experiences imposed by the sensory and 
perceptual apparatus we possess. This apparatus 
is itself shaped by the natural selection imposed 
on countless generations of organisms meeting 
needs and then complemented with our individual 
neurodevelopmental plasticity. With respect to 
sociality, a critical human need and an 
overarching element of the human environment in 
which beliefs are formed and tested, our 
behavioral plasticity (and corresponding 
  
underlying neural plasticity) can range from a 
mother-infant bond through passionate 
participation in a crowd, and is thus imbued with 
both poignancy and power.  
Beliefs serve needs. The need for confidence in a 
belief is in lockstep with the real or perceived 
urgency of the need it may serve to mitigate. The 
 sense  of urgency is related to the 
physiological stress effect, which, may be 
manifest along a range from subclinical to 
emergency and proportionately energizes the 
appropriate motivational system that serves a 
particular need. There is a hierarchy of needs, 
well known to most students of psychology as 
 Maslow s Need Hierarchy.  On a scale of 
relative urgency from basic biological integrity 
(health: physiology and homeostasis), to personal 
safety, need for society, desire for distinction 
(esteem in the eyes of a potential reproductive 
partner), to  self-actualization,  which to a 
biologist as well as an Army recruiter, involves 
 being all you can be,  most specifically to 
contribute directly or indirectly to kin and the 
next generation.  
Truths are beliefs about which validity is 
absolute, beyond confidence. Biological fitness, 
however, does not require perfection, it needs 
only for a trait, perhaps a belief, to be better than 
that of competitors. While there are always novel 
phenomena, unsolved mysteries, there is 
dissonance -- always a mismatch between reality 
and our understanding of it. All dissonance -- 
evokes some measure of the stress response (see 
below) but unsolved mysteries and inexplicable 
or extraordinary occurrences can also be haunting 
and even debilitating. As Camus observed, 
erroneous beliefs serve needs also: "A world that 
can be explained even with bad reasons is a 
familiar world. But on the other hand, in a 
  
universe divested of illusions and lights, man 
feels an alien, a stranger..." and as T.H. Huxley 
(1880) famously observed, "Irrationally held 
truths may be more harmful than reasoned 
errors."  
Mindful of imperfect senses, reasoning involves 
corroboration and social validation, and we are 
confident of our beliefs to that extent. In an 
uncertain world, however, we can never have 
sufficient confidence. In such situations (aren t 
they all) we will deploy our full panoply of 
strategies or mechanisms and invest progressively 
more energy in approximating a belief about 
which there can be no doubt   a truth. We 
enlarge our confidence in beliefs by testing them 
against reality, by means of the 
neurophysiological processes of correspondence 
and coherence. 
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III  
REALITY TESTING 
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"There are two modes of 
knowing, through argument 
and experience. Argument 
brings conclusions and 
compels us to concede them, 
but does not cause certainty 
nor remove the doubts in 
           
  
order that the mind may 
remain at rest in truth, 
unless this is provided by 
experience"(Roger Bacon, 
1268)*  
 
                              
. 
  
. 
             
      
. Correspondence and coherence are venerable 
constructs in philosophy which may well reflect 
dispositions and intrinsic biases attributable to the 
biology of the brain. Correspondence relies on 
experience of the world and occurs "when the 
facts and the proposition are identical," "What a 
man believes upon grossly insufficient evidence 
is an index into his desires of which he himself is 
often unconscious. If a man is offered a fact 
which goes against his instincts, he will scrutinize 
it closely, and unless the evidence is 
overwhelming, he will refuse to believe it. If, on 
the other hand, he is offered something which 
affords a reason for acting in accordance to his 
instincts, he will accept it even on the slightest 
evidence. The origin of myths is explained in this 
way." (Bertrand Russell 1912) from his "Roads to 
Freedom"). That is, external "reality" matches its 
internal representation. "Knowledge is the 
conformity of the object and the intellect," said 
Averroës in the 12th century.  
Correspondence began and continues to rely on 
(almost) random encounters with the world (as in 
infants) and then perceptions and curiosity. It is 
basically inductive and its processes provide the 
experiential premises of our inner representation 
of the world organized as cause-and-effect 
theories. First sensory contact of an organism 
with the world creates an impression   a 
sensation which participates in the internal 
representation of the world. Internal 
representations then evoke responses that more or 
       
  
less effectively cope with the environment, based 
in part on a previous experience, we behave in the 
most likely way to be successful, and much of 
this is coordinated by local mechanisms 
distributed throughout the body at the far reaches 
of the nervous system. There appears to be 
intrinsic pleasure that instantiates the seek-and-
solve paradigm.  
The economy of the body, mentioned earlier, will 
resist activation of a hierarchically higher 
mechanism to interpret and cope with a mismatch 
only when peripheral mechanisms have not 
resolved it. Dissatisfaction will lead to the 
problem being kicked upstairs to a higher 
hierarchical level, often energized by a growing 
stress response. Progressively more unresolved 
dissonance and the problem may evoke the most 
costly procedures of all, involving conscious 
attention. There is a large and rapidly growing 
literature of error-detection (van Veen and Carter 
2006) encouraged by a distinctive signal ( error 
related negativity  detected by eeg) and 
associated with the activity of the anterior 
cingulate cortex (van Veen and Carter 2002).  
Functions of specific areas of the brain are 
becoming better known by means of emerging 
radiological techniques, although many 
researchers remain very wary of 
structure/function correlations. Still there are 
observations that may inspire hypotheses about 
specific brain functions humans use to test reality.  
When the verbal centers of the left hemisphere (in 
a split-brain patient) do not have access to what 
was shown to the right hemisphere, they will 
make up a story. A right hemisphere lesion will 
lead to uncontrolled left hemisphere 
confabulating -- improvising plausible stories to 
rationalize missing data. In spontaneous 
confabulation, memories of past experiences 
  
(rather than ongoing realities) dominate narratives 
(Schnider 2003), recalling the deep neurological 
relationship between memory and imagination 
(see Schachter et al. 2007).  
Coherence involves "the quality or state of 
logical or orderly relationship of parts;" leading to 
a  united  or  orderly  whole. The process is 
internal and works with the percepts that 
correspondence provides. To ensure orderly 
integration of and access to experience, "narrative 
integration" of input is essential. At its best, our 
apparently continuous stream of consciousness is 
actually a series of frames, of  stills,  of 
 snapshots" -- what Oliver Sacks called 
cinematic vision (Sacks 2004).  
Internal representations of the world must "fit" 
with all preceding and collateral representations. 
Coherence is integral to cognition at every level, 
not least one's ineffable self, but is most 
publically manifest as our ability to create 
narrative: theories or stories based on likely 
causes and consequences. The need to narrate was 
put well by Kathryn Morton (1984): "A warp in 
the simian brain," she wrote, "made us insatiable 
for patterns--patterns of sequence, of behavior, of 
feeling--connections, reasons, causes: stories... 
Nothing passes but the mind grabs it and looks 
for a way to fit it into a story....Feverish for 
order... "  
Coherence strengthens our confidence in internal 
representations by assimilating perceptions 
consistent with that model, reconciling internal 
contradictions, and accommodating anomalies. 
Coherence is basically deductive and can act to 
"inform" perceptions about what to expect. The 
power of expectations, we are learning in recent 
years, is a formidable, if not the key element of 
  
conscious or non-conscious placebo effects (for 
example, Stewart-Williams and Podd. 2004).  
A narrative is a more-or-less linear sequence of 
ideas, and a theory is a narrative about causal 
relationships. It is by means of testing predictions 
informed by theories that infants develop, and it 
is this mode of operation that grows with us and 
serves the scientist and the infant. Gopnik and 
colleagues have developed a powerful metaphor 
with their work on  the scientist in the crib  (for 
example, Gopnik et al. 1999). Agnes Arbor 
(1954) points out that "when a scientist has a 
belief based on observations, its consistency with 
related beliefs based on other observations is an 
indication of the confidence we may have in its 
possible 'truth'" (p70). As Coleridge put it, "The 
imagination, organizing (as it were) the flux of 
the senses... gives birth to a system of symbols. . . 
consubstantial with the truths of which they are 
the conductors."  
Confidence. When dissonances are significant 
enough to evoke levels of stress activation to a 
level that gets our attention, we either dedicate 
some effort to obtaining more or better data, 
enhancing coherence by utilizing new data, or 
considering more coherent reconfigurations of the 
data we have. As the literature of cognitive 
dissonance theory abundantly shows, stress often 
leads us to selectively neglect or enhance key 
information, and while our resulting model may 
not be accurate, it may be sufficient, and stress 
levels are reduced to the extent we are successful.  
The processes of reality testing leading to 
confidence can motivate additional empirical 
testing: curiosity and exploration. They also 
encourage more elaborate or parsimonious 
narratives or texts into which experience is 
woven. The desire for confidence can range, of 
  
course, from the frivolous to deep concern about 
one's "immortal soul."  
When there is a perceived urgency of the need for 
increasing confidence, the activity invested in 
both establishing correspondence (by interacting 
with the environment) and coherence (by 
considering alternative narratives) may become 
intense. For example, Aouizerate (et al. 2004) 
identified obsessive collecting as one of the ways 
obsessive-compulsive disorder presents. In their 
review, they find stress-provoking erroneous 
internal perceptions as the central phenomenon 
and identify structures most prominent in their 
contribution to the disorder, including 
orbitofrontal cortex, the anterior cingulate cortex, 
the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex.  
At higher levels of cognition, the two reality-
testing processes may become asymmetrical 
when we are not satisfied with experiential 
evidence or the internal scheme for the 
organization of the evidence. To the extent that 
the urgency is perceived, elements of the 
autonomic nervous system -- the stress response -
- become engaged and energize the appropriate 
motivational system for meeting this particular 
need for increased confidence, the compass for 
which is "truth.".  
These sibling strategies are also, in Robert 
Sternberg's view key to the concept of 
intelligence.  ... the more intelligent, adaptive 
person has achieved a higher degree of external 
correspondence and internal coherence in his or 
her knowledge based and belief structures. People 
think unintelligently to the extent to which they 
make errors in achieving external correspondence 
or internal coherence  (Sternberg 1997:1031).  
The tests of reality attributable to correspondence 
and coherence proceed in a progressive mutually 
  
corroborating spiral of interactions, working 
together to provide confidence in the reality of a 
belief. As organisms that evolved to maximize 
biological fitness, beliefs need not be true, but 
simply more valid than those of competitors. 
 Truth  is a necessarily unattainable goal that 
keeps efforts to enhance validity steering in what 
seems the most useful direction at any particular 
point in our progress. The processes of acquiring, 
sharing, and applying knowledge, like judgments 
about what could or should be known, are 
subjects of endless discourse. But there is little 
that penetrates the depth of our concern about the 
meaning of knowledge or illuminates the fragility 
of the boundary between knowledge and its 
absence as failures of the accustomed system 
manifested in the disorders of knowing. 
             
 
 
IV  
AGNOSIA and HYPERGNOSIA 
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 We work in the dark   we 
do what we can   we give 
what we have. Our doubt is 
our passion and our 
passion is our task. The rest 
is the madness of art.  
Henry James  
 
           
                              
. 
  
             
      
. We may be more or less confident about our 
beliefs as processes of the senses and mind 
enable, but extraordinary extremes of the process 
       
  
of establishing or utilizing beliefs can be 
instructive. Neurologists are familiar with an 
extensive array of failures of one or more parts of 
this process attributable to trauma or disease of 
the brain that leads to an inability to recognize the 
reality of specific kinds of experiences. This is 
agnosia, a state in which a person may not be able 
to recognize stimuli even though the sensory 
system is unimpaired itself. These are unlike 
everyday failures of knowing such as when an 
experience may be so unique that it does not 
accrue sufficient confidence to be taken seriously 
or in  attentional blindness  (e.g., Simmons, 
2000), a common outcome of a percept being 
rejected for failing the test of coherence.  
Among the most interesting of agnosias is 
anosognosia, a denial of illness or debility, often 
subsequent to right hemisphere brain trauma or 
stroke, is a striking example of a mismatch 
between one s perceptions and reality. It 
involves a denial ranging from indifference to 
striking vehemence, often despite (apparently) 
clear evidence to the contrary. Spontaneous 
anosognosia was characterized by Schnider 
(2003) as an  inability to adapt thought and 
behaviour to ongoing reality.   
Hypergnosia, on the other hand is an 
extraordinarily intense confidence that an 
experience is true. It is particularly informative 
because of its extreme nature. The pursuit and 
solution of mystery can be imbued with intense 
urgency and the ensuing stress response 
powerfully energizing --- a pleasure that seems a 
heartbeat away from ecstasy. Einstein described 
the search for the insight that reconciles disparate 
ideas in terms that would credit a mystic in 
recalling "the years of searching in the dark for a 
truth that one feels but cannot express; the intense 
desire and the alterations of confidence and 
  
misgiving, until one breaks through to clarity and 
understanding, are only known to him who has 
himself experienced them" (in Beveridge, 
1950:81). Apparently, when confidence exceeds a 
certain threshold, the resolution of stress can 
provide a remarkable  release.  Einstein echoed 
the great physiologist, Claude Bernard: "those 
who do not know the torment of the unknown 
cannot have the joy of discovery." The 
neurologist/essayist Oliver Sacks recalled seeing 
the periodic table of the elements:  The actual 
presence of these elements reinforced the feeling 
that these were indeed the elemental building 
blocks of the universe that the whole universe 
was here in microcosm. I had an overwhelming 
sense of truth and beauty when I saw the periodic 
table. I felt that this was not a mere human 
construct, arbitrary, but an actual vision of an 
eternal cosmic order, and that any future 
discoveries and advances, whatever they might 
add, would only reinforce, reaffirm, the truth of 
its order  (1999). Dostoevsky spoke of an 
"eternal harmony" that he occasionally 
experienced:  There are moments, and it is only 
a matter of five or six seconds, when you feel the 
presence of the eternal harmony ... a terrible thing 
is the frightful clearness with which it manifests 
itself and the rapture with which it fills you   
(Alajouanine 1963).  
We can see the steps taken and eloquently 
expressed by such intellectuals and scholars, but 
surely this intense experience is known to many 
who have abruptly discovered (or invented) a 
sense of ineffable and powerfully emotional 
insight.  
The emotional component that might emerge 
when the processes of correspondence and 
coherence have gone as far as they could in an 
individual might be an extreme expression of the 
  
perceptual and cognitive pleasure described by 
Biederman & Vessel (2006). They observed an 
increased density of receptors for opioids at the 
deepest association areas where contact with 
stored information was possible, thereby enabling 
a new stimulus access to a large reservoir of 
information. With their theory in mind, it is 
reasonable to speculate that these everyday 
pleasures can increase in intensity, perhaps 
orchestrated in part by the processes of the stress 
response, such that the excitation that began with 
an innocent perception could thereby gain access 
to the corpus striatum with its multiple loops 
connecting emotional centers to higher cortical 
areas and thereby link powerful emotional surges 
with enhanced insight.  
A sense of possessing a transcendent belief that is 
 truer than truth,  often with a deep sense of 
peace and joy, seems to accompany the belief one 
has merged with the truth they sought. As Polanyi 
put it, "the personal participation of the knower in 
the knowledge he believes himself to possess 
takes place within a flow of passion.  The 
passion becomes the final corroboration:  We 
recognize intellectual beauty as a guide to 
discovery and as a mark of truth" (1958:300). 
This can be far more powerful than the 
satisfaction of a long sought understanding. It can 
be a uniquely explosive response in the spirit, 
corresponding perhaps, to d'Aquili and 
Newberg s "hyperlucid state of absolute unitary 
being  (AUB) with its  extremely strong sense 
of reality that is in fact said to be "more real than 
baseline reality  (1999) In d Aquili s view, 
while a baseline sense of reality needs sustained 
social corroboration, AUB can persist without it. 
This resonates with what Joseph Campbell (1968) 
termed  aesthetic arrest:   We may dance 
toward it and away, achieve glimpses, and even 
dwell in its beauty for a time; yet few are those 
  
that have been confirmed in that knowledge of its 
ubiquity which antiquity called gnosis and the 
Orient calls bodhi: full awakening to the 
crystalline purity of the bed or ground of one s 
own and yet the world s true being. Like 
perfectly transparent crystal, it is there, yet as 
though not there; and all things, when seen 
through it, become luminous in its light  (p 66). 
But does such an experience, transformative 
though it is, constitute belief? Or might the 
pursuit of confidence in beliefs simply be a 
preparation for deeper insights?  
Agnosia and hypergnosia point to the manner in 
which the central nervous system coordinates the 
integration of correspondence and coherence in 
the pursuit of confidence. This pursuit also 
involves the three major integrative capacities of 
the brain   motivation, affect, and cognition   
and the role of the physiological stress response 
in orchestrating their activity. 
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. The direction taken here is in the spirit of 
the proposal by Johnstone and Glass (2008). 
Their research with brain-injured adults 
persuaded them that spiritual experience 
involves the interaction of multiple 
specialized neuropsychological structures. 
They noted that brain activity that 
coordinates ongoing and remembered 
experience are ordinarily highly 
coordinated. Thus, either trauma that 
impairs right parietal cortex function or 
conscious suppression of the same site, can 
enable a sense of selflessness that may then 
be interpreted by activity of the left 
temporal lobe in terms of remembered, 
culturally interpreted and instilled 
constructs. Indeed, reality testing itself 
involves biologically validated momentary 
experiences interpreted in terms of past 
experiences. In this relentlessly self-
correcting updating of the meaning of 
experience, we conduct the vital business of 
distinguishing internal imagery from 
external stimuli.  
It is notable that several important 
neuropsychiatric syndromes are associated 
with dysfunctions in the processes of 
reality-testing (correspondence), story-
telling (coherence), or their integration. The 
role of the left cerebral hemisphere in 
creating coherence has been famous since 
Ramachandran and Blakeslee's charming 
and compelling Phantoms in the Brain 
(1998). They support the view, largely 
based on the evidence of disinhibition 
(release of a neural structure from the 
inhibitory influence of another site), that the 
left hemisphere includes structures that 
work to establish coherence.  
       
  
Several lines of evidence converge on this 
view of reality testing. Notably, the 
phenomenon of anosognosia, mentioned 
above. In Ramachandran s (1996) view, 
the right hemisphere detects discrepancies 
between information from sensory input 
and information residing in cerebral 
schemas (probably residing in the left 
hemisphere); it then helps determine the 
salience of information and whether or not 
it should be relayed further for possible 
action. Excellent descriptions are provided 
by Ramachandran (1996) who describes 
and discusses related agnosias. In 
schizophrenia there is evidence that poor 
insight into one s disorder is related to 
anosognosia, (Lele & Joglekar 1998), as 
well as evidence that different neural 
pathways are engaged during novel 
recognition memory in patients with 
schizophrenia compared to healthy 
individuals  (Crespo-Facorro et al. 2001).  
In normal circumstances, gaps in the 
continuity of a narrative (and thus 
confidence in its veracity) can be 
accomplished by interpolation, in which the 
next best information available is plugged 
into place, much in the way the blind spot in 
the back of the retina uses information from 
adjacent cells to "fill in." Additionally, the 
process of extrapolation can enable 
predictions based on past experience, a 
plausible trajectory of events, likely 
facilitated by the extraordinary access 
imagination and memory have to each other 
(Hassabis et al 2007). Indeed, the likely 
origin of abstractions such as time is likely 
based on experience and its representations 
(Boroditsky and Ramscar 2002)  
  
How are people able to think about things 
they have never seen or touched? We 
demonstrate that abstract knowledge can 
be built analogically from more 
experience-based knowledge. People's 
understanding of the abstract domain of 
time, for example, is so intimately 
dependent on the more experience-based 
domain of space that when people make an 
air journey or wait in a lunch line, they also 
unwittingly (and dramatically) change their 
thinking about time. Further, our results 
suggest that it is not sensorimotor spatial 
experience per se that influences people's 
thinking about time, but rather people's 
representations of and thinking about their 
spatial experience.  
PMID: 11934006 [PubMed - indexed for 
MEDLINE] When gaps attributable to a 
failure of the right hemisphere s 
interaction with the left, special efforts are 
taken to maintain an apparently seamless 
and satisfying narrative. The processes 
responsible most likely coincide, at least in 
part, with a left hemisphere process 
nicknamed  the interpreter  by Gazzaniga 
(2000), a capacity  to make an inference 
about both internal bodily states and 
external actions of ourselves and others . . . 
a powerful system that is at the core of 
human belief formation . . . .  (Gazzaniga 
1992:113).  
Information about left hemisphere functions 
suggest an important role in establishing a 
sense of coherence, even at the cost of 
interpolating implausible elements as it 
accommodates whatever fragments of 
experience it has access to. Apparently the 
comfort of a narrative that does not possess 
  
gaps is sufficiently valued that conflicting 
percepts go unattended. This can evoke a 
sense of familiarity and stability 
(Ramachandran 1996) that reduces stress. 
High confidence also has distinct biological 
value if it allows access to and executes 
behavioral patterns that advance fitness. 
Ambivalence or indecision can undermine 
the effectiveness of individual behavior, and 
in social contexts, doubt can be contagious, 
undermining social and cultural 
undertakings predicated on confidence in 
the general validity of specific beliefs.  
A significant contribution to the 
development and maturity of these 
processes may be play, including play in 
which there is a "willing suspension of 
disbelief," Samuel Taylor Coleridge s 
(1817/1985) hallmark of artistic creation -- 
overlooking the quality of coherence in the 
service of an enlarged insight. Like all play, 
the creation and appreciation of aesthetic 
objects is best undertaken in a safe 
environment, free of uncontrolled stress. 
Coleridge contrasted his view with that of 
his friend Wordsworth's advocacy of paying 
particular attention to novelty as a way of 
"awakening the mind's attention from the 
lethargy of custom" (Coleridge 1817/1985)  
Much of the neuropsychological momentum 
for viewing the left hemisphere as an organ 
of coherence comes from evidence of 
disinhibition. Other information, clues in 
real or apparent support for the narrative of 
left hemisphere specializations for 
coherence, are needed from other sources 
where the shadow of possible confounds 
attributable to states of disease or damage 
are less dark. Of interest in this regard are 
  
clues such as the left hemisphere's 
superiority in dealing with abstract object 
recognition as opposed to the right 
hemisphere's superior ability in specifics 
(Marsolek 1999), and its abilities in 
probabilistic as opposed to deductive 
reasoning, seen more clearly in the right 
hemisphere (Osherson et al 1998). 
Interestingly, after appropriate priming, a 
solution to a semantic problem presented to 
the right hemisphere by means of the left 
visual field was more likely to evoke a 
sense of sudden insight, than when 
presented to the right hemisphere (Bowden 
& Jung-Beeman, 2003). Apparently the 
 Aha!  sense of sudden insight reported 
by participants, involved enhanced activity 
in the right superior temporal gyrus, as 
revealed by functional magnetic resonance 
imaging (Bowden et al. 2005).  
Right hemisphere function in validating or 
at least enhancing confidence in beliefs 
appears more involved with a monitoring 
function. Correspondences of the 
organism's experience with the real world 
begins at the sense organs where a cascade 
of feedback loops enables countless 
adjustments to fine tune the organism to the 
circumstances it finds itself in. For example, 
the muscle spindle, a complex peripheral 
sense organ embedded in muscle, is 
continually responding to mismatches 
between the environment the motor 
program that anticipates general needs, and 
fine details of muscular action needed to 
cope with precision. Activities here and 
above continually inform higher centers of 
control of the ongoing negotiations, and 
only the detection of errors that cannot be 
adjusted at lower levels get very far 
  
upstream This may constitute a nested 
hierarchy of interactions between the 
organism and its environment.  
Stress. All behavior is an evanescent 
extension of morphological and 
physiological potential. The stress response 
consists of a host of coordinated 
physiological (including neurobehavioral) 
mechanisms specialized to cope with real or 
perceived challenges to real or perceived 
biological needs (Greenberg 2002). Needs 
in biology can be nicely correlated with the 
basic "need hierarchy" proposed by 
psychologist Abraham Maslow. For 
example, the psychological construct of 
 self-actualization  corresponds to 
 maximized fitness,  ideas linked by the 
motto  be all you can be.   
The motivational systems that serve these 
needs are neurologically ancient and highly 
integrated. Motivational systems, often 
thought of as  driving  behavior are ever 
ready to be activated and guide the system 
to meet the current need. This state of 
readiness, however, is translated into 
adaptive activity only when the resources 
required to meet a perceived need are 
insufficient. The signal of insufficiency is 
the stress response. The physiological stress 
response is both a cause and a consequence 
of seeking and solving mysteries and its 
responses can range from mild autonomic 
arousal through dramatic panic. As 
mentioned above, it is evoked by even mild 
dissonance (Hadley 1996) such as 
discrepancies between perceptions and 
expectations (Goldstein 1987).  
According to D.E. Berlyne (1960), novelty, 
uncertainty, or conflict are all particularly 
  
effective in elevating arousal, presumably to 
cope with the mismatches they represent 
between resting and stimulated state. In his 
review of psychoendocrinology of stress, 
Seymour Levine (1993) observed that an 
adrenocortical stress response is evoked in 
proportion to the degree of discrepancy 
between current and prior experience of 
specific aspects of the environment. 
Selective activation of specific brain centers 
is at the heart of what Gerald Huether 
termed  the central adaptation syndrome  
(1996), in which higher associative brain 
structures are affected by as much as they 
affect the deployment of the stress. In his 
conceptualization, brain centers that detect 
stress can initiate compensating actions 
considering both the urgency of the 
demands upon the organism and the 
perceived prospect for effective coping, 
particularly an assessment of the 
controllability of the situation. These same 
brain sites are subject to modification. The 
theory underscores the ability of the stress 
response to interact with and orchestrate 
adaptive responses as well as the initiating 
neurology.  
In their recent review, Dedovic (et al. 
2009), observed that a consistent 
consequence of the psychological stress (of 
difficult mental arithmetic) diminished 
activity in orbitofrontal regions (assigning 
emotional valence to stimuli, decision 
making, planning, expectations, and 
intuition). Bechara (et al. 2000) considers 
the orbitofrontal cortex vital to the decision 
making that is guided by  somatic 
markers  (afferent feedback signals 
  
including emotions) that occur at many 
levels.  
Some view this area as part of the limbic 
system, and other limbic areas 
(hippocampus) also had suppressed activity. 
The anterior cingulate cortex of the frontal 
lobe, on the other hand, was more active. 
This is a site associated with empathy, 
error-detection, and the assessing and 
modulating of emotional responses as well 
as the many autonomic functions influenced 
by the stress response. In the hierarchical 
scheme described earlier, progressively 
more expensive (in terms of arousal and 
attention) coping mechanisms are not 
recruited unless necessary.  
Stress and Cognition. With respect to the 
influence of autonomic activation on 
cognition, a striking part of acute 
uncontrollable stress that underscores the 
sometimes paradoxical aspects of the 
response to stressors is the effect of the 
initial catecholamine release into body and 
brain. The catecholamines released 
(dopamine, norepinephrine, and 
epinephrine) reallocate internal resources to 
cope with emergency circumstances. These 
neuromodulators activate the amygdala 
(emotional expression and learning) while 
they suppress activity in the prefrontal 
cortex (associated with foresight and 
planning) (Arnsten 1998). The secondary 
longer-term coping response involves the 
steroid hormones of the adrenal cortex. de 
Kloet et al. (1999) observed that while the 
hormones of the stress response normally 
protect the brain and are necessary for 
cognition, damage in specific parts of the 
brain can be caused by extreme stress. Part 
  
of this apparent paradox is resolved by the 
fact that there are two kinds of adrenal 
cortical steroid hormones, which affect the 
brain in different ways. Activation of 
receptors for these hormones in the brain 
usually favor adaptive coping behavior 
involving changes in attention and selection 
of appropriate responses, but if levels of 
activation of the two corticosteroid-receptor 
types are unbalanced by disproportionate 
secretion of the two hormone types, 
maladaptive responses can be evoked. 
Further, the stage of ongoing information 
processing (acquisition, consolidation, 
retention) affects the manner in which the 
brain will respond to the hormones  
Stress is also a mainspring of creativity, 
which like most adaptive processes is 
energized by mild to moderate stress: it 
affects attention which may evoke close 
focus on possible stressors or a wide net of 
attention across a larger spectrum of 
stimuli. This rapid alternation of cognitive 
strategies --searching the repertoire and 
focusing on a specific option -- recalls 
"fight or flight," a snap decision made as 
intensity increases with apparent urgency of 
the situation. Under such pressures, familiar 
things may be seen in new ways and new 
phenomena may be seen free of perceptual 
bias, such as inattentional blindness.  
As an organism s resources are reallocated 
by the stress response to cope with the 
ongoing or anticipated challenge. In an echo 
of the fight or flight response, distress is 
manifest when the consequences of the 
stressor are perceived as dangerous to 
biological fitness, while eustress is 
experienced when the challenge represents 
  
an opportunity to enhance one s prospects 
, depending on expectations, emotional 
valence, and perceived controllability of the 
stressors. 
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"always becoming, never 
is." (Schiller)  
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. This view of truth, like most of an organism s 
critical functions, is one of dynamic relationships 
between inner and outer worlds, between memory 
and imagination, and between valid particulars 
and plausible generalities. A cascade of 
subsequent approximations by which our 
relentless ambition to achieve it is, in the words 
of Schiller, "always becoming, never is" * 
(quoted by Greenberg 2004) 
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approaching, never arrived; Truth, in the words of Schiller, 
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